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Summary
Lacking in much of the current research on religion and corruption is a sense that there may be
alternative ways that people view corruption, which in their minds may be moral, and that if we are to
truly develop an understanding of how religion influences people’s attitudes and behaviour towards
corruption, we must start from a critical and interpretive perspective at the individual level of analysis.
This paper argues that the methodologies used in many current studies are not adequate to study
what is ultimately an individual decision, and one that is at least in part informed by a person’s own
ethical and moral standpoint.  As such, starting research with the mindset that particular types of
activities are corrupt, and thus ‘wrong’, may prevent researchers from uncovering why people develop
particular attitudes to corruption, or why they choose to behave in a way labelled by some as corrupt.
If corruption research is to explore some of these issues at the individual, as well as the regional and
national levels, it is important to learn from existing work that examines how attitudes are formed, both
on religion and the impact that religion has on attitudes to moral issues and on moral reasoning. A
number of studies, few of which deal specifically with corruption, are reviewed in order to establish
useful ways forward for corruption researchers.
Research on religion and attitudes towards deviant behaviour shows that individuals’ interpretation of
messages on moral behaviour is significant in determining their acceptance or rejection of deviancy.
However, there is little evidence to suggest that the religious reject behaviour that is ‘anti-social’ any
more than the non-religious. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that religion, in terms of religious
content, impacts upon individuals’ attitudes to public morality. Membership of a religious community
that rejects behaviour seen as being ‘corrupt’ seems more likely to have an impact, but a lot depends
upon whether members of the community are encouraged to use religious principles to think through
moral issues, or to interpret religious teachings literally.
The implications of this for research on corruption are
 The messages individuals receive about behaviour that is deemed to be moral and behaviour that is
seen as ‘deviant’ may be conflicting and the ways in which they interpret such messages are important,
influencing their ideas about what constitutes ‘corruption’.
 People are part of multiple communities – religious, family, friends, work, professional and so on – and
may not separate their lives into ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres, governed by public and private morality.
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 The communities of which individuals (including researchers and those involved in anti-corruption
initiatives) are part (including religious communities) all, in one way or another, impact upon their
attitudes towards corruption and so research must focus on individuals not in isolation but as members
of wider communities.
 To understand why corruption occurs, therefore, it may be necessary to put aside prior assumptions
about what corruption is and why people engage in it.
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1 Introduction
Mohammedans are Mohammedans because they are born and reared among the sect,
not because they have thought it out and can furnish sound reasons for being
Mohammedans; we know why Catholics are Catholics; why Presbyterians are
Presbyterians; why Baptists are Baptists; why Mormons are Mormons; why thieves are
thieves; why monarchists are monarchists; why Republicans are Republicans and
Democrats, Democrats. We know that it is a matter of association and sympathy, not
reasoning and examination; that hardly a man in the world has an opinion on morals,
politics, or religion that he has got otherwise than through his association and
sympathies (Mark Twain, nineteenth century American author, humorist and political
commentator, cited in Hauk and Saez-Martin, 2002, pp. 311-312).
Interest in fighting global corruption has increased significantly since the former head of the World
Bank, James Wolfensohn, famously spoke out against the ‘cancer of corruption’ in 1996. Since then,
international organizations, bilateral donor agencies, charities, multinational corporations, individual
activists, government watchdogs and so on have struggled to explain why corruption occurs, let alone
to formulate clear strategies for its eradication. Millions of dollars have been spent by donor agencies
on anti-corruption programmes and several well-known attempts to measure corruption to inform
better policy-making have been made, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index and the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Despite this, many  perceive
corruption to be on the increase globally and new and innovative ways to fight corruption continue to
be sought.
Much time has been spent by the World Bank, among others, in establishing corruption as a symptom
of institutional failure, while cultural aspects of corruption have been deliberately underplayed
(Marquette, 2003), although a growing body of work is emerging that explores the potential of cultural
explanations for corruption. Of particular interest are those studies that use religion as a proxy for
culture and attempt to establish a link between religion and corruption at the national level. It has been
argued that in countries where religion plays a vital role in the lives of most people, many, including
public servants, are likely to derive their ethical framework at least in part from their religion. Religion is
said to provide many with a language of ethics and, often, an actual set of rules to live by, some of
which can be interpreted as being of particular importance to fighting corruption.
The increasing attention given to the religion-corruption nexus stems from the argument that fairness
and honesty are basic to the teachings of many religions, and that they can therefore be used in
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attempts to reduce corruption (Luxmoore, 1999). All the major world religions attempt to define
humans’ relationship with a sole or dominant deity, but also served as sources of institutions used in
managing early societies. Thus they all address the issue of honesty (see, for example, Reisman,
1979; Armstrong, 2007). According to Beets, two apparent assumptions underlie attempts to enlist the
support of religious leaders and groups in the fight against corruption. The first is that “faithful
adherents to religion will refrain from corruption because of the inherent theft, dishonesty, illegality, and
mistreatment of others [it implies]. The second, related assumption is that those who are not faithful
adherents of religions are more likely to engage in corruption because of an absence of religious
guidance” (Beets, 2007, p. 72).
However, in apparent contradiction of these assumptions, many of the most corrupt countries in the
world (according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index [TI-CPI]1) also rank high
in terms of religiosity (using indicators such as those used by the Pew Global Attitudes Project).2 On
this basis, there would appear to be little evidence to support the above assumptions, but there is a
growing body of literature that looks to see if it is the type of religion that makes a difference as to
whether or not a country is corrupt (Beets, 2007; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Paldam, 2001).
I have argued elsewhere that the evidence for a causal relationship between religion (or types of
religion) and either higher or lower levels of corruption is in no way convincing (Marquette, 2010).  The
methodologies being employed thus far are insufficient for proving – one way or another – a causal
relationship. The literature is largely quantitative, with a dearth of empirical, fieldwork-based evidence.
The results are often contradictory, depending upon which international dataset has been used, which
points to significant methodological concerns. The findings are tentative at best, offering comparisons
between various datasets and pointing towards possible explanations, sometimes rooted in theory,
sometimes not. The data used are often flawed, making the explanations that are put forward
problematic. Data are aggregated at the country level and cannot tell us anything about how
individuals’ attitudes towards corruption are formed, the impact of religious (and other socio-cultural
influences) on attitude formation, or the ways that individuals condemn or justify corrupt behaviour
using the language of religion.
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This paper argues that the methodologies used in many current studies are not adequate to study
what are ultimately individual decisions, that are at least in part informed by individuals’ own ethical and
moral standpoints.  As such, starting research with the mindset that particular types of activities are
corrupt, and thus ‘wrong’, may prevent researchers from uncovering why people develop particular
attitudes towards corruption, or why they choose to behave in a way that some would label as corrupt.
I do not posit here a ‘correct’ ethical or moral standpoint on corruption. As Migdal (2001, pp. 19-20)
points out, “What may be easily labelled as corruption or criminality, such as nepotism or smuggling,
can also be looked at, for instance, as a morality favoring kinship ties over meritocracy or one
expressing the right of movement of people and goods across the boundaries arbitrarily imposed by
state law.” Whether an individual agrees or not with Migdal’s characterization of the nature of
corruption, what is lacking from much of the current research on religion and corruption is a sense
that there may be alternative ways that people view corruption, which in their minds may be moral. It is
argued in this paper that, if a valid understanding of how religion influences people’s attitudes and
behaviour towards corruption is to be developed, it is necessary to start from a critical and interpretive
perspective and from an individual level of analysis.
There are currently few, if any, published studies that approach the study of religion and corruption in
this way. If corruption research is to explore some of these issues at the individual level, as well as at
the regional and national levels, it is important to look at the literature on how attitudes are formed, in
relation to religion, and the impact that religion has on attitudes towards moral issues and on moral
reasoning. This paper reviews a number of studies, few of which deal specifically with corruption, in
order to establish useful ways forward for corruption researchers. Unlike the majority of the studies to
date on corruption and religion, which tend to be largely economics-based and use international
datasets, this literature is largely sociological and psychological. Although studies generally focus on
the individual level of analysis, some do use global survey data, such as the World Values Surveys.
Many of the studies are empirical in nature, although some are rooted within the theoretical literature,
and most are quantitative, rather than qualitative (i.e. structured survey-based rather than semi-
structured interview-based).
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Importantly, it has not been possible to identify any literature that examines these issues in developing
country contexts, with the overwhelming bulk of the studies based on U.S. population surveys and a
smaller number focusing on the Scandinavian and Benelux countries. Much of the current interest in
global corruption arises from its impact on development and developing countries in particular; as
such, the available studies may provide a useful guide for future research on corruption, but it is
important to consider the significance of context to their findings. There is no reason to assume a
priori that results of surveys of college students in the U.S. will be replicated by surveys or interviews
with public servants and others in developing countries; nevertheless, there is still much to be learned
methodologically from exploring the theoretical and explanatory issues raised by this literature. This
paper is thus both a methodological exploration and an original contribution to a rich literature that
delineates links (or the lack thereof) between religion and moral decision-making, by extending it to the
context of the study of public sector corruption, particularly in the developing world.
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2 Religion and attitudes towards moral issues
Increasingly, the influence of religion on attitudes towards corruption is becoming of interest to a wide
range of actors. The World Bank has a Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics; the World Faiths
Development Dialogue works on corruption; several international faith-based organizations, such as
Christian Aid, Tearfund and Islamic Relief, have undertaken anti-corruption work; and so on. Making
links between religion and corruption seems like common sense in many ways. It may be reasonable
to assume that many people derive their ethical framework from their religion. Certainly those people
who consider themselves to be religious are likely to do so, but even those who describe themselves
as secular, humanist, agnostic or atheist may be influenced by the religion(s) that forms a significant
part of their cultural heritage, even if its influence is not acknowledged. Many early studies (and some
contemporary ones) by theologians and other ‘religionists’ seem to assume that there is a clear,
measurable, positive relationship between religiosity and morality. Even David Nussbaum, the Chief
Executive of Transparency International, referred to a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis,
which concluded that “’A belief in hell tends to mean less corruption and less corruption tends to mean
a higher per capita income…Combining these two stories…suggests that, all else being equal, the
more religious a country, the less corruption it will have and the higher its per capita income will be’”
(cited in Nussbaum, 2006, p. 14).
However, the bulk of the literature shows that the impact of religion on attitudes towards moral issues
is not clear-cut. Sometimes religion has a measurable influence and sometimes it does not.
Sometimes religious people take a more ‘moral’ position on issues and sometimes they do not. In
addition, as noted above, the data used and analysis conducted is often subject to challenge. For
example, the original article cited by Nussbaum has since been updated to take out the conclusion
quoted above because errors in the data used to arrive at it were subsequently detected (Kliesen and
Schmid, 2004).
Furthermore, as we will see, many factors come into the formation of attitudes towards moral issues
– age, education level, gender, engagement with a wider community, the nature of the religious
community(ies) involved, the nature of the moral issue itself, and so on. What is clear is that religion
itself, in terms of theology or religious teachings, appears to have very little influence on attitudes
towards moral issues related to corruption, with socialization being a much more significant factor in
determining individuals’ attitudes towards corruption. Thus one of the problems identified is that the
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influence of religion lies less in what the texts say than in how interpreters, priests, and so on interpret
them and also in how their relevance and importance to collective social behaviour is understood.
Much of the literature seeks to explain ‘deviant’ behaviour, often in the context of increased
secularization and the (perceived) decline in moral values. Ter Voert et al (1994), for example,
conclude from their review that the literature suggests that “the decline of religion and the decline of an
‘absolutist’ perspective on moral values go hand in hand. Secularization has led to moral breakdown,
and interaction is based on self-interest rather than on any more charitable notions…Empirical
research indicates that religious people are more likely to express strong disapproval of behaviours
like cheating on taxes and welfare than nonreligious people” (p. 302). In another example, Cortes
(1965) claims that “Most acts of delinquency are amoral, and the roots of morality are either principally
or exclusively religious. Delinquents, therefore, should be lower than nondelinquents in religiosity or
religiousness” (cited in Hirschi and Stark, 1969, p. 202).
A highly influential study by Hirschi and Stark (1969) called this claim into question. Their own survey of
young people in California showed that the alleged relationship is not the case. Respondents were
asked to disclose both their own actual deviant acts (such as stealing, getting into fights, and so on).
In addition, the authors examined police reports on delinquency. They found that attendance at church
did not impact either actual delinquent acts or attitudes towards delinquency, even amongst
respondents who believed in a literal hell and devil. This research ran counter to what many saw as a
‘common sense’ approach to delinquency and undermined a number of public and social programmes
in the U.S. that encouraged increased religious attendance as a deterrent to delinquent behaviour.
However, a number of empirical studies emerged in the following two decades that showed just the
opposite effect, confirming Cortes’ original hypothesis. One of the most interesting is that by Tittle and
Welch (1983), who sought to find theoretical explanations to oppose Hirschi and Stark’s surprising
findings. In order to test the hypotheses, the authors undertook a multi-state (U.S.) survey, including
respondents of different ages, education levels, income, religious affiliations, gender, and so on. They
included questions on deviant behaviour, including small theft, large theft, pot (marijuana) smoking,
illegal gambling, assault, lying to an intimate, tax evasion and not standing for the national anthem.
They label the two hypotheses proven valid by their research ‘normative dissensus’ and ‘perceived
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conformity’. Based on Parsons’ work on social systems (1937, 1951), ‘normative dissensus’ is defined
as a state in which “disagreement about the badness of various behaviours prevails”, and their
hypothesis states: “The extent to which religiosity influences conformity varies directly with (a) general
normative dissensus in a given context (H
1
a) or (b) with normative dissensus concerning specific
offences (H
1
b)”’ (p. 659, emphasis in original). In other words, religion is more likely to impact attitudes
towards those moral offences specific to that religious context. As such, religiosity may help to predict
“conformity to rules uniquely prohibited by religious institutions but not to rules prohibited by society as
a whole, [which] actually reflects the effect of normative dissensus’” (p. 659). According to Tittle and
Welch,
The fundamental idea is that social order rests on collectively held values…To the extent
that people internalize moral commitments reflecting consensual values, they will
probably not contemplate deviance, or if they do consider rule breaking, moral revulsion
or potential feelings of guilt will restrict action. Religion presumably aids internalization by
linking supernatural sanctions to moral precepts, many of which correspond to behaviour
norms of the larger society. Moreover, participation in religious activities and institutions
continually reinforces and strengthens internalized moral commitments – therefore,
according to functional thinking, religious training and active participation should be highly
predictive of conformity to social rules – at least those social rules which religious groups
define as having moral components (1983, pp. 656-657).
In terms of ‘normative dissensus’, “[t]he statistics support the idea that involvement in religious
activities has a strong constraining effect on deviant behaviour in contexts characterized by relative
normative ambiguity. Apparently when secular moral guidelines are unavailable, in flux, or have lost
their authority and hence their power to compel, the salience of religious proscriptions is enhanced” (p.
672). They found that there was little to no difference between religious and non-religious respondents
when it came to behaviour that is condemned by society as a whole, particularly large theft, assault
and tax evasion. However, they found considerable differences when it came to behaviour that society
generally does not condemn widely, such as pot smoking and not standing for the national anthem.
The implication for research on corruption is that, if their hypothesis holds, religion may have more of
an impact on attitudes concerning corrupt behaviour that society generally does not condemn widely
than it does for behaviour that is condemned less widely. In corruption parlance, this could mean the
difference between ‘low level corruption’, also known as ‘petty corruption’ – cutting red tape,
engagement in clientelistic networks, and so on, i.e. the sort of corruption that many engage in – as
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opposed to ‘high level corruption’, also known as ‘grand corruption’ – political corruption, state capture,
and so on, i.e. the sort of corruption engaged in by the powerful alone.
‘Perceived conformity’ is based on work in criminology by Sutherland and Cressey (1978). It asserts
that where “deviance is directly related to excess exposure to social definitions (or message inputs)
favourable to deviance…[it] seems to suggest that the greater one’s religiosity, the less likely the
person will be exposed to an excess of favourable deviant definitions; hence, the greater the likelihood
of conformity” (Tittle and Welch, 1983, p. 657). Sutherland and Cressey are known for their differential
association opportunity theory (DAO), which
…explains the process through which an individual comes to engage in criminal
behaviour. Its fundamental principles rest on the argument that opportunities and
networks of criminal behaviour are critical determinants of an individual’s engagement in
a criminal action. In other words, people who commit crime not only have frequent
interaction with those that condone such behaviour, but also have the opportunity to do
so (Alolo Al-hassan, 2006a, p. 7).
DAO theory has also been used by Alolo Al-hassan (2006b) in her study of the relationships between
gender and corruption, in which it helps to explain the impact of corrupt networks and opportunities for
corruption on attitudes.
Tittle and Welch’s ‘perceived conformity’ hypothesis states, “The extent to which religiosity influences
conformity varies directly with the aggregated religiosity displayed in a given context (H
4
)” (p. 660,
emphasis in original). It would be expected to work best where messages are both widespread and
consistent with religious messages. In terms of ‘perceived conformity’,
…boundary maintenance and moral differentiation may become most salient when
substantial variation is perceived in the moral conduct of contemporaries. In such
contexts the perceived rarity of virtuous behaviour may enhance its value and motivate
religiously active people to distinguish themselves from the mass of sinners through
conspicuous conformity to social norms (p. 673).
This is a very interesting finding for corruption research. It contradicts much earlier research by
arguing that “religiosity inhibits deviant propensity most effectively in contexts where the proportion of
people who are non-religious is greatest” (p. 674). In other words, it may work best when religious
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people feel that not engaging in corruption demonstrates their own religiosity in contrast to the corrupt
behaviour engaged in by ‘the mass of sinners’. However, in countries where few people are non-
religious, corruption is widespread, and those who are known to engage in corrupt behaviour are also
known to be religious, it is difficult to see how religious people can seek to differentiate themselves in
the way suggested by this hypothesis.
As Tittle and Welch conclude, “religiosity has the greatest effect on conformity when each of the four
contextual conditions prevail: general normative ambiguity, low social integration, generalized
perception of low peer conformity, and a relatively high proportion of people who are not religious”
(1983, p. 674). This could explain findings such as those in the study by Beets (2007) and may be
useful for researchers in helping to explore why countries with high levels of religiosity often have high
levels of corruption.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. studies produced findings that both contrasted with and
confirmed those of Hirschi and Stark, leading to theoretical and empirical bewilderment. In 1996, over
twenty-five years on from the original study, Stark sought to explain why such differences in findings
might exist. He argued that subsequent studies showed a strong sociological impact, in that young
people in other parts of the country than the West coast, where the original study was conducted,
seemed to behave differently and have different attitudes. It is widely agreed that people on either
coast in the U.S. generally demonstrate lower levels of religiosity than those in the middle states, and
most of the studies with contrasting findings took place away from either coast. Stark explained, “I
suspect that what counts is not only whether a particular person is religious, but whether this
religiousness is, or is not, ratified by the social environment. The idea here is that religion is
empowered to produce conformity to the norms only as it is sustained through interaction and is
accepted by the majority as a valid basis for action” (1996, p. 164).  He thus explains the differences
by concluding, “Religious individuals will be less likely than those who are not religious to commit
delinquent acts, but only in communities where the majority of people are actively religious” (p. 164,
emphasis in original).
This is interesting, especially as it directly contradicts Tittle and Welch’s findings on ‘perceived
conformity’. In Stark’s analysis, based on a number of empirical studies, widespread membership in
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religious communities provides a disincentive to engage in delinquent behaviour. Although these
studies are all based in the United States, and generally consist of surveys of teenagers and college
students, the contradictory findings may be important for corruption research more generally because,
no matter what the outcome, the research seems to point towards membership in religious
communities as having a significant impact on attitudes towards moral issues, although only where
the social environment condemns delinquent behaviour.
White (1968) reviewed theories contemporary at the time that suggested that theology should be seen
as the primary source of differences between religions and between those that are religious and those
that are not. These suggested “that individuals who ‘believe’ seek a consonance between …
theological tenets and their attitudes and behaviour in other spheres of life” (p. 24). However, White
himself disagreed with these theories, identifying instead with work by Lenski (1961) that showed how
communalism and associationalism, as aspects of religious involvement, are much more significant
than theology, leading to what White called the “interaction model of religious influence” (1968, p. 25).3
Partly the significance of communalism and associationalism could, he asserted, be explained by the
way that interaction is backed both by sanctions (e.g. loss of status or position within the community,
public condemnation) and by the reinforcement of community norms. Harris and Mills (1985) concur
with White, and “further suggest that measures of religious participation will better explain the impact
of religion on…attitudes than will religious preference, belief, or intensity measures” (pp. 139-140,
emphasis in original).
Membership in religious communities comes through as a significant factor in another study by
Scheepers and Van Der Slik (1998) in the Netherlands. They argue that previous research is flawed
because it isolates individuals and neglects important sources of socialization, including the role of
parents, spouses and members of the individuals’ religious communities, “with whom they might
discuss all kinds of everyday problems as well as moral issues” (p. 679). Although they support the
hypothesis that “moral attitudes are primarily affected by one’s individual characteristics, that is, more
specifically by religious involvement, religious beliefs, one’s education level, and personal income”,
they see the need to look at theories that suggest that social interaction in religious communities is
particularly significant, because “the influence of religion on a variety of moral issues might operate
through moral community formation” (pp. 679-680). Referring to work by Stark (1996), for example,
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they reflect that the research seems “to imply that people take roles in a community, (re-)define social
situations, deliberate upon specific issues, and adjust their responses to each other. As a result,
specific subcultural patterns, that is, values, norms, and behaviours prevail” (p. 680).
The nature of the values, norms and behaviours to which Scheepers and Van Der Slik refer is seen as
being highly significant. For example, Woodrum (1988) conducted a city-wide survey in Raleigh, North
Carolina, to examine the impact of community membership on ‘traditional-conservative’ versus ‘liberal-
modernist’ world views, and the impact of these world views on moral attitudes. According to him,
“Adherence to traditional conservative versus liberal modernist world-views and corresponding
attitudes toward a range of moral issues are better understood as deriving from general patterns of
cultural change, socialization, and social relations” (Woodrum, 1988, p. 553), as opposed to ‘status
politics’,4 as previous research had suggested. As he further explains,
Controversies over moral issues can be anticipated in complex societies like the United
States when social change affects various segments of the population unequally.
Societal trends of cultural pluralism, secular rationality in economics, and the legal
formalization of individual rights influence the moral sensibilities of highly educated
cosmopolitans and youths disproportionately. The plausibility structures of such persons
increasingly incline them toward moral relativism. Yet there remains substantial numbers
of moral conservatives who adhere to traditional absolutes…and oppose the moral
relativism of liberal modernists (p. 554).
Woodrum found that roughly 25 per cent of his respondents were either morally conservative or
morally liberal, leaving 50 per cent somewhere in between. This means that conservatism and
liberalism should not be assumed to be outliers but just either end of a broad spectrum. He also found
that ‘status politics’ was not a viable explanation for moral conservativism, because those who might
feel ‘threatened’ by moral relativism were not those in fear of losing their high status, i.e. those with
higher education and income levels. Indeed, the higher the education and income level, the more likely
respondents were to be liberal modernists. He also found that respondents were more likely to be
morally conservative if they were women, over 60 years old and, in contrast to expectations related
particularly to ‘status politics’, had a high school or lower education level and were African-American
(including ‘upwardly mobile’ African-Americans with higher education and income levels) (pp. 561-
563). These conclusions led him to argue that the focus of most research in the field, which tries to
understand the reasons for moral conservatism, is misplaced. Instead, he argued, there is more to be
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learned from looking at “the young, the highly educated, those estranged from traditional communities,
and those secularly self-identified and political liberal [who] have embraced moral relativism most
conspicuously”, in order to try to understand their social dynamics (p. 568). He also argues that,
although there are obvious socialization effects, people with conservative characteristics are more
likely to be attracted to conservative religious communities, in other words, conservative religious
communities do not ‘turn’ liberals into conservatives, but are made up of self-identified conservatives
who then foster a particular set of values, beliefs and norms at the community level (pp. 567-569).
There are some significant methodological and theoretical implications here for corruption research.
Firstly, Woodrum’s findings apply to personal moral issues (e.g. pornography, homosexuality,
premarital sex) and it is not clear how respondents might react to public moral issues. This brings us
back to Tittle and Welch’s ‘normative dissensus’ hypothesis. Based on this work, corruption
researchers might find either:
a) liberal/rational          moral relativism          acceptance of corruption
conservative/traditional          moral conservativism          condemnation of corruption
or:
b) liberal/rational          moral relativism          condemnation of corruption
conservative/traditional          moral conservativism          acceptance of corruption.
In other words, there seems to be a correlation between the first two variables but not the third –
corruption. It is clear that, no matter what, processes of socialization and social dynamics seem to be
key; but what is also clear is that being either liberal/rational or conservative/traditional may also be
significant, in terms of corruption, although how it might be significant is not entirely clear.
Going back to the Netherlands study by ter Voert et al (1994), the effect of religion on ‘self-interest
morality’, including in pecuniary issues (e.g. tax evasion, insurance fraud, selling goods without
disclosing problems), is examined, which brings us closer to research on corruption in terms of public
moral issues. They helpfully begin by reviewing previous research, explaining that
Several studies indicate that in European countries and the United States respondents
who are less likely to describe themselves as religious or to engage in religious practice
are more inclined to have a permissive moral outlook towards actions involving pecuniary
  
  
  
  
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dishonesty…one possible explanation for the relationship between religion and self-
interest morality is that religion carries a certain set of absolute moral values (p. 303).
As the main religious communities in the Netherlands are Protestants and Catholics, they try in their
research to assess whether there is a difference between adherents of these two communities, as
well as between the religious and the non-religious. Referring to work by Greeley (1989), they suggest
that the two denominations are differentiated in the following ways:
Protestants value the virtues of initiative, integrity, honesty, and thrift more than Catholics
because Protestants are individualists and have an imagination of society as ‘sinful and
God-forsaken’. Protestants have a dialectical imagination; they picture the individual as
struggling for his or her personal freedom over against the sinful oppression of social
networks, and they stress those values of behaviours that contribute to the strengthening
of personal freedom and independence from group control. Catholics, on the other hand,
are communitarian because they have an imagination of society as sacramental, that is,
revelatory of God – the Catholic analogical imagination pictures humans as integrated
into social networks – networks which in fact reveal God – and stresses those values
and behaviours which contribute to the building up and strengthening of those networks
(ter Voert et al, 1994, pp. 303-304).
Their findings suggest that Catholics are more permissive of pecuniary issues than Protestants, but
conclude that denomination matters less than church involvement. Indeed, “We conclude that
Christian belief and church involvement both had moderate effects on self-interest morality. Strong
Christian believers were more likely to have a strict moral outlook than those low on Christian
belief…our results indicate that the decline of religion and the decline of a strict attitude toward self-
interest morality go hand in hand…and this difference exists irrespective on nonreligious background
characteristics. The decline of religion seems to bring about a process of uncertainty about morals”
(pp. 317, 320). However, it is very important to note that they found that non-religious people still rated
highly on disapproval ratings, so the difference between religious and non-religious respondents is at
the high end of the disapproval scale.
Ter Voert et al also argue that their findings dispute Greeley’s claims about the differences between
Protestants and Catholics, because pecuniary issues have community damaging impacts (pp. 318-
319).  This conclusion seems to be based on quite a simplistic understanding of community and
social networks: it assumes, for example, a single Catholic vision of ‘society’ and that the nature of
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‘religious belief’ is clear. However, not only are there variations within worldwide Catholicism5 but also
the nature of religious belief is far from clear. It is well known that in some instances people are ‘born
into’ religious traditions, whereas adherence to others requires a conscious individual choice. Thus
self-declaration of religious denomination amongst certain groups (notably Catholics) does not act as
a particularly good guide to how members act, nor how their religiosity influences their day-to-day
behaviour. The significance for corruption research is that the religious communities under study need
to be understood and differentiated, in terms of their overall ‘vision’ of society, as members of global
religious communities, and in terms of their own national and regional contexts.
In a similar vein, Middleton and Putney (1962) differentiate between different types of moral standards
in order to explain differences between various theoretical and empirical studies. Previous studies,
they explain, “have failed to find relationships between measures of religiosity and ethical behaviour,
nondelinquency, humanitarianism, and altruism. In contrast, several studies have found the religious
less likely to violate certain moral standards” (p. 142). The difference, once again, seems to be
between private moral standards, such as sexual morals, and public moral standards, such as
cheating. It is worth citing them at some length:
We believe that this particular confusion, and much of the confusion surrounding the
relation between religion and morality, derives from failure to distinguish two different
types of ethical standards – the ascetic and the social. Social standards proscribe
actions which in general are harmful to the social group, and, we hypothesize, tend to be
shared by the religious and nonreligious alike as part of a general social ideology. The
fact that religious ideology may also proscribe these actions is incidental; we would hold
with Durkheim that religion is more a reflection of social morality than a source of it.
Cheating, then, is a violation of a social standard, and it is not surprising that the
nonreligious engage in it no more often than the religious. In contrast, ascetic standards
– abstinence from sensual indulgences, gambling, and the like – derive primarily from an
ascetic religious tradition. Within the context of religion violations of ascetic standards
may be held spiritually harmful to the perpetrator. But since such violations are usually
not directly or obviously harmful to the social group – at least in moderation – ascetic
standards have less persuasiveness to the secularly oriented individual. He is therefore
more likely to violate them. In short, we hypothesize that differences in behaviour
between the religious and the nonreligious are confined to specific areas and are a
product of differences in standards rather than a differential upholding of standards (pp.
142-143).
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Their own study, which asked about both attitudes and actual actions, corroborates this: the religious
are more likely to believe that anti-ascetic actions are wrong and are less likely to engage in them.
However, when it comes to anti-social actions, the study found that there was no difference between
the religious and the nonreligious, in terms of either attitudes or violating their own standards by
engaging in anti-social actions (p. 151). Interestingly, while women were found to be much stricter in
terms of moral standards related to anti-ascetic actions, particularly sexual behaviour, there was little
difference between men and women in terms of anti-social actions, and in one action particularly –
stealing from hotels – women were much more permissive than men. Differentiating between different
types of moral attitudes, therefore, seems to be important for research. It is interesting that many of
the studies reviewed here took place after Middleton and Putney’s study in 1962, yet they continued to
fail to make this distinction.
Middleton and Putney raise another very interesting methodological issue in their paper, one that
surprisingly does not often come up in the literature – the issue of social desirability bias, or the
proclivity of respondents/interviewees to present themselves in such a way that others will see them
favourably, although they do not refer to it as such. At the end of their survey, they asked a simple
question: “How frank have you been in your responses – very frank, partially frank, not frank at all?”
They found that this question led many respondents to go back to the survey to revise their answers in
order to be more honest. Considering that corruption research involves behaviour that is socially (and
often ascetically) undesirable, social desirability bias must be taken into account, and Middleton and
Putney’s question may be one way to deal with the issue.
It is useful to conclude this section by looking at a study that tries to differentiate between values and
attitudes. Harris and Mills (1985) explain that they propose a theory in which values partially determine
attitudes, quoting Rokeach: “While an attitude represents several beliefs focused on a specific object
or situation, a value is a single belief that transcendentally guides actions and judgements across
specific objects and situations…value is a determinant of attitude as well as of behaviour” [Rokeach,
1968, pp. 160, 157; cited in Harris and Mills, 1985, p. 138]. In this context, they state, “we regard
broadly specified attitudinal orientations, such as civil liberties or on deviant behaviour, as indicators of
a general value such as self-determination” (Harris and Mills, 1985, p. 138).
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Looking at value conflict is important when trying to understand the impact of religion and belief on
attitudes towards morally complex and controversial subjects. Harris and Mills further explain:
To this premise of inner ambivalence yielding unified preference, we add two corollaries.
First, competing values and norms not only create inner conflict in the deciding person
but also generate a substantial amount of autonomy and flexibility in decision-
making…Second, many such contrasting values and interests are structurally rooted in
each person’s roles and statuses, making the ambivalence sociological because it is
rooted in social structure…The anchorage of conflicting values in simultaneously held
roles (or a single role) provides a degree of legitimacy to one’s behaviour regardless of
how the decision comes out. One can both contain and express inconsistent views
without losing role or status, since group life is predicted upon such inconsistency and
supports it through sociological ambivalence’ (Harris and Mills, 1985, p. 138).
Because of this, they argue that it is important to control for the effects of value conflict in studies
looking at the impact of religion on attitudes, and they identify the two main value conflict as
‘responsibility for others (RF0)’ and ‘self-determination (SD)’. In their own study on attitudes to
abortion, they found that individual respondents needed to deal with their own internal value conflict
between RFO and SD in order to come to a view on abortion, and that the sources of conflict came
from both within their own religious communities and outside. They refer to these variables as
‘additive’, or existing socially, outside religious involvement, and ‘interactive’, or legitimized within
religious groups (Harris and Mills, 1985, p. 141). This again brings us back to Tittle and Welch’s
‘normative dissensus’ and ‘perceived conformity’ hypotheses and reminds us of the need to try to
identify ‘messages’ that respondents receive from both within their religious communities and outside
them, and to identify possible sources of value conflict regarding corrupt behaviour.
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3 Religion, corruption and moral reasoning
The previous section looked at literature that has examined the relationships between religion and
attitudes, basically looking at the outcome of religion’s influence on attitudes. This section, in contrast,
looks at literature that examines the relationships between religion and moral reasoning, that is,
basically looking at processes rather than outcomes. It is obvious from the previous section that
religion has an impact on attitudes towards moral issues, even if there is not much of a consensus
about what this impact is. The same lack of consensus can be found in the literature on moral
reasoning. Much of the literature reviewed here focuses on the sophistication of moral reasoning
processes, concluding that the type of religiousness is significant to how an individual processes
messages about moral issues. What is meant by ‘type’ is not the religion itself but the way it is
expressed and understood by the individual.
A recent study by Duriez and Soenens (2006) is particularly useful and is discussed in some detail
here. They begin by summarizing some key studies regarding moral action choices:
…moral behaviour is the result of at least four component processes: (1) identifying a
situation as a moral problem, (2) figuring out what one ought to do and evaluating
possible plans of action, (3) evaluating how the various courses of action serve moral
and nonmoral values and deciding which action will be pursued, and (4) executing the
plan of action…there are several interpretive systems by which moral action choices can
be generated. People may rely on justice reasoning or so called moral reasoning…but
they may also rely on concepts of care…social norms and conventions…or religious
prescriptions (Duriez and Soenens, 2006, p. 76; referring to studies by Rest (1983);
Thoma, Rest and Davison (1991); Kohlberg (1976); Gilligan (1977); Nisan (1984); Turiel
(1983); and Lawrence (1979).
Duriez and Soenens highlight Kohlberg’s arguments regarding moral reasoning as particularly
significant. According to them
Kohlberg (1981) has argued that religiosity and moral reasoning are inherently unrelated
because they constitute two distinct areas of human concern: whereas moral decision
making is grounded in rational arguments of justice and is influenced by level of cognitive
development (e.g. education) and exposure to socio-moral experiences (e.g. role-taking
opportunities), religious reasoning is based on revelations by religious authorities.
Whereas the primary function of morality is to resolve competing claims among
individuals, the primary function of religion is to affirm morality. In other words, whereas
moral reasoning provides moral prescriptions, religious reasoning affirms moral
judgement as meaningful (Duriez and Soenens, 2006, p. 76).
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This is not to suggest, of course, that religious persons are incapable of rational arguments based on
justice, nor that those making such arguments must do so without reference to religious texts or
arguments. It depends, they assert, on how individuals process moral action choices, based upon the
type of religious or nonreligious person they are and their stage of moral development. By ‘type’,
Duriez and Soenens mean the “extent [to which] people accept the existence of God or some other
transcendent reality and…being religious or not and being spiritual or not” (p. 77). They call this the
“inclusion or exclusion of transcendence”.6
Individuals may process religious contents either literally or symbolically, but in this interpretation the
inclusion or exclusion of transcendence is significant. A person may interpret transcendence literally,
what Duriez and Soenens refer to as “literal affirmation”, in which “the literal existence of the religious
realm is affirmed” (as in religious fundamentalism), or “literal disaffirmation”, in which “the existence of
the religious realm is rejected and in which the possibility is lost out of sight that religious language has
a symbolic meaning. Religious language is understood in a literal way, but this time religion is rejected”
(p. 77).7 Similarly, individuals may interpret religious contents symbolically, but this may result in either
“symbolic disaffirmation”, in which “the existence of the religious realm is rejected, but where the
possibility is taken into account that religious contents might refer to a hidden symbolic meaning”, or
“symbolic affirmation”, where “the existence of the religious realm is affirmed, and in which one tries to
encompass and transcend reductive interpretations in order to find a symbolic meaning in the religious
language which has personal relevance” (p. 77).
The significance of this way of looking at the way individuals interpret religious contents in terms of
moral decision-making is evident when comparing Duriez and Soeren’s model with their discussion of
Kohlberg’s (1984) six stages of moral development:
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Source: Based on discussion in Duriez and Soerens (2006, p. 78).
Kohlberg’s stages, Duriez and Soerens say, should be understood in terms of the level of
sophistication each stage requires. It does not imply that those at Stage 6, say, will make ‘better’
decisions than those at Stage 3, but that they demonstrate more consistency in their approach. As
they explain, “When there is a conflict between conventions and moral principles, a conventional
reasoner will judge by convention rather than by moral principle, whereas a post-conventional
reasoner will judge by principle rather than by convention. However, this does not imply that individuals
at the post-conventional level are also more moral” (Duriez and Soerens, 2006, p. 78).
These two models help to link religiosity and morality. In religious communities where principled
reasoning is valued (Stages 5 and 6), members will have higher preferences for this than in those
communities where principled reasoning is not part of the teaching. However, what also needs to be
taken into consideration is where the stages of moral reasoning fit with respect to Duriez and Soerens’
literal/symbolic and the inclusion/exclusion of transcendence model. It is the combination of the two
that is significant in terms of predicting the quality of outcome, i.e. how moral a decision will be. In
other words, “The moral reasoning of religious persons depends on the seriousness of their religious
commitment and on the moral stage which is normative for their religious community” (Duriez and
Soerens, 2006, p. 78).
Their own study, mainly of Belgian university students and their parents, confirms this. Those
respondents who were more religious and processed religion in a literal sense had lower moral
reasoning scores. Duriez and Soerens conclude,
Stage 1 Avoid punishment 
Pre-conventional 
Stage 2 Satisfy one’s needs 
Stage 3 Be a nice person 
Conventional 
Stage 4 Maintain the social order 
Stage 5 
Focus on the moral principles upon which social norms 
are based 
Post-conventional 
Stage 6 
Focus on abstract ethical principles, such as equality and 
respect for the dignity of human beings 
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…although religious people tend to be conservative and submissive, they are neither
more or less happy, good-natured and tolerant. This suggests that the impact of being
religious or not on individuals’ lives is limited when it is separated from the impact of the
way people process religious contents. The impact of the way people process religious
contents, on the other hand, seems vitally important, with people processing religious
contents in a literal way not only showing less advanced moral reasoning abilities but
also less psychological well-being, less empathy and more prejudice (2006, p. 81).
A related point is of course that the way a particular religious community approaches principled
reasoning is also very important. In an earlier study, Duriez (2003) suggests that Roman Catholic
churches attract people with literal affirmation values, so people with low moral competence may be
attracted to the Roman Catholic Church, presumably because of its emphasis on literal orthodoxy.
These ideas may also have relevance for the policy-making community. Encouraging moral
development education programmes, for example, in literal-orthodox religious communities that do not
value principled reasoning is unlikely to produce more principled moral reasoning. The nature of
particular religious communities needs to be taken into account. As Duriez and Soerens conclude,
There is a consensus among researchers that educational programs targeted at
stimulating moral development should be aimed at learning to translate one’s ethical
principles to solutions for specific problems with which one is confronted in real life, even
under those circumstances where factors like prejudice, authority or the so-called moral
majority try to prevent people from thinking about the different aspects that are part of the
problem (2006, p. 81).
Another study that contributes to our understanding of how religion may or may not contribute to an
individual’s moral reasoning is by Sapp and Jones (1986). Like Duriez and Soerens, they suggest that
“religiosity is not a crucial determinant of situational honesty… [and that] religious people can be more
intolerant, more prejudiced and lacking in humanitarian concern than non-religious people” (p. 208).
They are quick to point out, however, that other studies do show contrasting results and that “the
relationship between religiosity and moral reasoning may be curvilinear”, especially for children who go
to religious schools, for whom early conventional moral reasoning may be more sophisticated than
their peers. However, studies do show that such children do not seem to move towards post-
conventional reasoning (p. 209), again suggesting that the religious community in which people are
located is significant.
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Sapp and Jones refer to Allport (1966), who makes a “distinction between the intrinsic orientation (a
religious sentiment in which faith is both the supreme value and the master motive) and the extrinsic
orientation (a utilitarian, self-serving attitude providing self-justification and endorsement of one’s way
of life)” (p. 209). This seems to refer to whether or not religion is seen as an end in itself or a means to
bring meaning to one’s life. However, in Allport’s work it means the difference between someone who
goes to church regularly and who bases his or her life around religion and someone who goes to
church more sporadically and is more secular – or at least less religious - in outlook (Allport, 1966, pp.
454-5).
However, Sapp and Jones identify weaknesses in Allport’s model, which make research based upon it
difficult. Referring to work by Batson (1976) and Batson and Raynor-Prince (1983) , they point out that
Allport’s model seems to assume that an intrinsic orientation is a more mature orientation, whereas it
is not necessarily so. Indeed, “it may indicate a fanatical devotion to orthodoxy” (Sapp and Jones,
1986, p. 209). Extrinsic orientation can also be either negative (e.g. religion as a means of providing
status, networks and even wealth) or positive (e.g. religion as a framework for articulating a position on
social justice). So rather than assuming that an intrinsic orientation will be a more moral orientation, an
intrinsic orientation can have both positive and negative effects on moral reasoning.
Further, as Sapp and Jones go on to say, “as Allport’s definition of mature religiosity was translated
into operational concepts, several components were omitted…These were: 1) mature religious
sentiment is integrative and accepting of complexity; 2) mature religious sentiment is self-critical and
doubting; and 3) mature religious sentiment emphasizes a continuing, tentative search for more
knowledge about religious questions” (Sapp and Jones, 1986, p. 209).  Again, we can see the
relevance of Duriez and Soenens’ model and Kohlberg’s levels of moral development here. It is the
openness to principled reasoning, the ability and desire to approach moral issues from a self-critical
perspective and an emphasis on religion as a ‘quest’, or “an endless process of probing and
questioning generated by the tensions, contradictions, and tragedies in their own lives and in society”
(Batson, 1976, p. 32), that leads to more mature moral reasoning. It could certainly be argued that the
skills required for mature moral reasoning are just the sorts of skills needed by someone faced with a
decision about whether to behave corruptly or not.
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Sapp and Jones’ study is far too narrow to draw meaningful conclusions, as it is simply a survey of 97
undergraduate students at one conservative U.S. university, all of whom were taking a module on
educational psychology. However, their findings may still be applicable to corruption research: those
who see religion as a quest to find existential meaning tend to be more principled in moral reasoning,
but “intrinsic religiosity and principled moral reasoning are not highly related…the evidence also
suggests that intrinsic religiosity may have more in common with conformity and a devotion to
orthodoxy than it does with an introspective concern with social justice” (p. 213). The implications of
this are that religion experienced intrinsically, as an end in itself, may not play a role in attitudinal
formation regarding corruption, while the opposite may be true for religion experienced extrinsically.
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4 Conclusion
The studies discussed here are all based in either the United States or the Benelux countries, but the
language used will be familiar to anyone engaged in research in developing countries – traditional,
rational, modern, secular, orthodox, and so on. However, the current Western research on religion and
corruption, and on religion and deviant behaviour more generally, seems to reproduce the public/
private distinction between the secular and religion, between public and private moralities. Work in
public administration by Ekeh (1975) and Hellsten and Larbi (2006) question the relevance of this
dichotomy in a developing country context. In Nigeria, for example, Smith (2007, p.5) argues that,
…when Nigerians talk about corruption, they refer not only to the abuse of state offices
for some kind of private gain but also to a whole range of social behaviour in which
various forms of morally questionable deception enable the achievement of wealth,
power, or prestige as well as more mundane ambitions. Nigerian notions of corruption
encompass everything from government bribery and graft, rigged elections, and
fraudulent business deals, to the diabolical abuse of occult powers, medical quackery,
cheating in school, and even deceiving a lover.
Thus in many developing countries, public and private morality are said to overlap, making the public/
private distinction a false dichotomy. From anthropology, writers such as Bloch (1977), Sperber
(1975),  and Boyer (1994), for example, emphasize the cognitive process and how ultimately ‘moral
systems’ in many developing countries are often worked out in terms of an ‘applied ethics’, which may
or may not incorporate ‘religious’ or transcendent elements. This points to the need for real caution in
assuming that the application of the methodologies described in this paper in a developing country
context, and in the context of corruption, will produce similar results. They may, of course, but they
also may not.
Still, there is much here that may assist researchers looking to understand how and why corrupt
behaviour occurs. Research on religion and attitudes towards deviant behaviour shows that
individuals’ interpretation of messages on moral behaviour is significant in terms of determining their
acceptance or rejection of deviancy, but there is little evidence to suggest that the religious will reject
behaviour that is ‘anti-social’ any more than the non-religious. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest
that religion, in terms of religious content, impacts upon individuals’ attitudes towards public morality.
Membership of a religious community that rejects behaviour seen as being ‘corrupt’ seems more likely
to have an impact, but a lot depends upon the way in which members of the community are
encouraged (or discouraged) to engage in principled reasoning.
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In either case, the individual on his or her own, or as part of a religious community, is likely to face
conflicting messages in terms of behaviour that is deemed to be ‘deviant’. Because of this, it is
important to approach the study of corruption with an open mind in terms of defining what constitutes
corruption. Individuals exist within multiple communities – religious, family, friends, colleagues,
professional and personal networks and so on. Although messages from these various communities
may very well conflict, it is clear that the communities will all, in some way or another, impact upon
individual attitudes towards corruption. The same can of course be said about those individuals who
conduct research on corruption or design policies to combat it: all go through similar processes of
socialization. No matter what the economic impact of corruption is upon development and developing
countries, it is becoming increasingly clear that to really understand why corruption occurs, it may be
necessary to put aside prior assumptions about what corruption is and why people engage in it.
Corruption, Religion and Moral Development 27
Notes
1 The TI-CPI is a ‘survey of surveys’ that looks at perceptions of corruption and then ranks countries
according their score. It can be found at www.transparency.or, along with an explanation of its
methodology.
2 Religiosity, although not formally defined in the Pew Global Attitudes Project http://pewglobal.org/
is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “religiousness, religious feeling or sentiment” or
“affected or excessive religiousness”. Measures of religiosity focus on self-definition as a member
of a religious community, regular participation in religious services and rituals, and regular prayer.
3 White explains that the interaction model of religious involvement contains two principles: “The first
of these principles is that religion is first and foremost a group phenomenon…The second basic
principle…is that the religious group, like any other group, has a particular normative structure”
(1968, p. 25, emphasis in original).
4 Woodrum explains that although ‘status politics’ emerged from Weber’s three irreducible
dimensions of social stratification (economic, political and status prestige), it is more often
associated with American social science of the 1950s (1988, pp. 556-57). Citing Wood and Hughes
(1984), he explains that  [s]tatus politics theory predicts that ‘moral reform (anti-pornography) social
movement adherence will be more likely among: 1) The geographically mobile, [notably] migrants
from rural areas and small towns to cities, especially Protestant migrants…2) The old middle
class, [including] owners of family-owned businesses and self-employed professionals, small
businesses, especially in rural and small town settings…3) The upwardly-mobile status discrepant,
[including] the newly wealthy, upward mobile Catholics and upward mobile Blacks….4) The over-
rewarded status discrepant, [the discrepancy owing to] low investments (education or occupation)
coupled with high returns(income) (cited in Woodrum, 1988, p. 556, emphases in original).
5 Guiso et al (2003) argue that their study shows that Catholics raised after Vatican II are less likely to
break legal norms than pre-Vatican II Catholics. They do not provide much in the way of evidence or
explanation for this claim, but it certainly highlights the danger of seeing religious communities as
homogenous masses. It may also point to the role of normative values concerning principled
reasoning within religious communities, but without evidence, it is not possible to make a definite
claim in this regard.
6 Based on early work by Wulff (1991).
7 Richard Dawkin’s recent work on The God Delusion is a good example of this.
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